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ABSTRACT
We study the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life insurers to sys-
temic risk between 2000 and 2012. For our full sample period, we find systemic risk in the
international insurance sector to be small. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to the fragility
of the financial system peaked during the recent financial crisis. In our panel regressions,
we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant
driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to sys-
temic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ leverage, loss ratios, and funding fragility.
Keywords: Systemic risk, insurer size, interconnectedness, insurance.
JEL Classification: G01, G22.
“SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size,
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider
financial system and economic activity.”
Financial Stability Board, 11/04/2011
1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group (AIG) became
the first example of an insurance company that required (and received) a bailout due to it being
regarded as systemically important. Not only did AIG’s near-collapse come to the surprise of most
economists who considered systemic risk to be confined to the banking sector, but it also spurred
a realignment of insurance regulation towards a macroprudential supervision of so-called global
systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). As a consequence, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
together with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) recently published a
list of nine G-SIIs which will ultimately face higher capital and loss absorbency requirements. In
their methodology, insurers are deemed to be of systemic relevance to the global financial sector, if
they are of such size and global interconnectedness that their default would cause severe disruptions
in the financial sector and subsequently the real economy.
However, the (heavily criticized)1 methodology proposed by the IAIS has only undergone lim-
ited empirical scrutiny so far. Most importantly, the relation between the interconnectedness and
systemic risk of insurers has not been analyzed before. In this paper, we intend to fill this gap in
the literature by investigating whether the interconnectedness of insurers with the global financial
sector in addition to their size increased the insurers’ individual contribution to systemic risk. As
the main result of our analysis of a panel of global insurers from 2000 to 2012, we find that in-
terconnectedness only increases the systemic vulnerability of large life and non-life insurers. In
contrast, the impact of an insurer’s interconnectedness on its contribution to systemic risk is much
less clear.
1 For example, the Secretary General of the Geneva Association, John Fitzpatrick, criticized the IAIS indicators
for penalizing risk diversification.
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Economists have long neglected the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize the whole
financial system. In contrast to banks, insurers are not subject to depositor runs and thus do not
face the risk of a sudden liquidity drain,2 hold more capital (see Harrington, 2009) and are less
interconnected horizontally with the rest of the financial sector. However, the case of American
International Group (AIG) showed that insurers can become systemically important nonetheless
if they engage too heavily in business activities outside the traditional insurance sector. As a
consequence, the Financial Stability Board urged the IAIS to identify G-SIIs that could potentially
destabilize the global financial sector and to implement new regulation for these insurers. Building
on the experiences made during the AIG case, the IAIS (2012) recently published a proposal for
a methodology for identifying G-SIIs that cites non-core and non-insurance activities, insurer size
and interconnectedness as the major drivers of systemic risk in the insurance industry.
Both the question whether insurers can actually become systemically important and the ques-
tion whether the IAIS’s proposed methodology is suitable for identifying G-SIIs remain relatively
unanswered in the literature. Early treatments of the topic of systemic risk in insurance include the
works by Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009) and Cummins and Weiss (2012).3 In the latter,
it is hypothesized that non-core activities and high degrees of interconnectedness are the primary
causes of insurers’ systemic relevance. The interconnectedness of insurers is also empirically ana-
lyzed by Billio et al. (2012) who argue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic risks in
times of financial crisis. In a related study, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that systemic risks exist in
the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in banking. More importantly, systemic risk
in insurance appears to have grown partly as a consequence to the increasing interconnectedness of
insurers and their activities outside the traditional insurance business. Chen et al. (2012) put a spe-
cial emphasis on the insurance sector but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intraday
stock price data that the insurance sector is exposed but does not contribute to systemic risks in the
2 Although one could possibly think of an “insurer run” on life insurance policies, this possibility appears to
be highly unlikely as insurance customers are often protected by guarantees and as cancelling a long-term life
insurance policy often implies the realization of severe losses. Consequently, there exists no example of a default
of an insurer in the past that caused significant contagion effects (see, e.g., Eling and Pankoke, 2012).
3 Other analyses of systemic risk in insurance include the works of Eling and Schmeiser (2010);
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
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banking sector. While the former two studies are only concerned with the interconnectedness of
banks and insurers, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014) also study the impact of size, leverage and other
idiosyncratic characteristics included in the IAIS methodology on the systemic risk exposure and
contribution of U.S. insurers during the financial crisis.4 Most importantly, they find that insurer
size seems to have been a major driver of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S. insur-
ers. Several of the IAIS indicators (like, e.g., geographical diversification), however, do not appear
to be significantly related to the systemic risk of insurers. Finally, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2012)
support the too-big-to-fail conjecture for insurers by showing that insurer mergers tend to increase
the systemic risk of the acquiring insurers.
We complement the existing empirical literature on systemic risk in insurance by performing
the first panel regression analysis of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of international in-
surers. In particular, we test hypotheses that size and interconnectedness could drive the systemic
importance of international insurers. To measure an insurer’s exposure and contribution to the
fragility of the financial sector, we follow Anginer et al. (2013, 2014) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel
(2012, 2014) and employ the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010) and
ΔCoVaR methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), respectively. We then estimate these
measures for a sample of 253 international life and non-life insurers for the period from 2000 to
2012 and perform panel regressions of the quarterly MES and ΔCoVaR estimates. As independent
variables, we use insurer-specific and macroeconomic variables that have been discussed in the
literature as potential drivers of systemic risk. Most importantly, we employ the measure of inter-
connectedness proposed by Billio et al. (2012) which is based on a principal component analysis
of the stock returns of financial institutions.5
Based on a sample of 253 life and non-life insurers, we find systemic risk in the international
insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the literature for banks. However,
confirming the results of Baluch et al. (2011), we find a strong upward trend in both the exposure
4 In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2013) analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are systemically
important based on the insurers’ SRISK (see Acharya et al., 2012).
5 Other potential measures of the interconnectedness of financial institutions include the measures proposed by
Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2012) which are both based on Granger causality tests.
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and contribution of insurers to the fragility of the global financial system during the financial crisis.
In our panel regressions, we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the financial sector
to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of
insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ size and leverage.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the
methodology used in our empirical study. Section 3 presents the results of our investigation into the
determinants of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Concluding remarks are given in Section
4.
2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our main
independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
2.1 Sample construction
We construct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international insurers from
the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. For reasons of relevance,
we concentrate on insurance firms with total assets in excess of $ 1 billion at the end of 2000. We
then omit all firms for which stock price data are unavailable in Datastream. Next, we exclude all
secondary listings and nonprimary issues from our sample. Further, we exclude Berkshire Hath-
away which is listed as an insurance company in Datastream due to its unusually high stock price.
Balance-sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope database and
all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to minimize a possible bias in
our results stemming from currency risk.
Finally, we split our data sample into life and non-life insurers. The definition of life and non-
life insurance companies in the company lists of Datastream is somewhat fuzzy.6 Therefore, the
6 For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insurance compa-
nies in Datastream’s company lists.
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industry classification of Datastream is cross-checked with the firms’ SIC code (Worldscope data
item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331) and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
code (Worldscope data item WC07040, ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms which cannot be
clearly classified as life or non-life insurance companies.7 Additionally, all company names are
manually screened for words suggesting a non-insurance nature of the companies’ business and
the respective companies being excluded from the sample. In total, we end up with an interna-
tional sample of 253 insurers, containing 112 life insurers and 141 non-life insurers. For increased
transparency, the names of all insurers in our sample are listed in Appendix A.1.
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the different dependent and independent
variables we use in our empirical study. An overview of all variables and data sources is given in
Appendix A.2.
2.2 Systemic risk measures
Our analysis focuses on the exposure and contribution of individual insurers to the systemic risk
of the global financial sector during the period 2000 through 2012. Consequently, we employ an
insurer’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), Systemic Risk Index/Capital Shortfall (SRISK) and
ΔCoVaR as main dependent variables in our regression analyses. We estimate the three measures of
systemic risk for each quarter in our sample using daily stock market data for our sample insurers.
Our choice of these systemic risk measures is motivated by the fact that these measures have
been extensively discussed in the literature and are also used by regulators and central banks for
monitoring financial stability (see Benoit et al., 2013).8 As our first measure of systemic risk,
we use the quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall which is a static structural form approach to
measure an individual insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. It is defined by Acharya et al. (2010) as
7 Consequently, HMO, managed care and title insurance companies are not included in the final sample.
8 All three systemic risk measures we employ share the property that they are all based on economic theory and
capture different aspects of systemic risk. Since the recent financial crisis, several other measures of systemic risk
have been proposed in the literature. Further examples for such measures apart from those used in this study are
due to De Jonghe (2010); Huang et al. (2011); Schwaab et al. (2011); Hautsch et al. (2012); Hovakimian et al.
(2012) and White et al. (2012).
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the negative average return on an individual insurers stock on the days a market index experienced
its 5% worst outcomes. As a proxy for the market’s return, we use the World Datastream Bank
Index in our main analysis.
Next, we implement theΔCoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), which
is based on the tail covariation between the returns of individual financial institutions and the finan-
cial system. We use ΔCoVaR as an additional measure of an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk
as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) criticize the MES measure for not being able to adequately
address the procyclicality that arises from contemporaneous risk measurement.9 While the uncon-
ditional ΔCoVaR estimates are constant over time, the conditional ΔCoVaR is time-varying and
estimated using a set of state variables that capture the evolution of tail risk dependence over time.
However, since we calculate ΔCoVaR based on stock prices for a given quarter, the standard state
variables used for estimating the conditional CoVaR show almost no time-variation. Consequently,
we focus on estimating the unconditional version of ΔCoVaR in our analysis. An insurer’s con-
tribution to systemic risk is then measured as the difference between ΔCoVaR conditional on the
insurer being under distress and the ΔCoVaR in the median state of the institution. A lower value
of ΔCoVaR indicates a higher contribution to systemic risk, while a positive MES indicates an
exposure to systemic risk rather than a stabilizing effect.
As our third systemic risk measure, we use SRISK which attempts to measure the expected
capital shortfall of a firm. SRISK is given as the average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk
Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). An insurer’s SRISK
is estimated by the insurer’s book value of debt weighted with a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%)
plus the weighted long run Marginal Expected Shortfall multiplied by the insurer’s market value
of equity.
9 Conversely, Acharya et al. (2010) criticize the ΔCoVaR measure as being based on a non-coherent risk measure.
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2.3 Explanatory variables
In this subsection, we characterize the main independent variables we use in our panel regres-
sions and robustness checks later on. In our analysis we attempt to capture the key features that
make insurers become systemically relevant. We thus concentrate on the factors that have recently
been suggested by the IAIS (2011, 2012) as potential sources of systemic risk in insurance. We
therefore include in our regressions proxies for an insurer’s size, its capital structure, non-core
activities, and interconnectedness with the financial system.
To proxy for the latter, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a financial insti-
tution proposed by Billio et al. (2012). Let Zi be the standardized stock returns of the ith insurer
and G = Cov(Zi, Zj)i j be the covariance matrix of the insurer’s daily stock returns. Using principal
component analysis, we are able to decompose this matrix into a matrix Λ, which is a diagonal
matrix of the eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λN of G, and a matrix L = (Lik)ik that contains the eigenvectors of
the returns’ correlation matrix. Billio et al. (2012) then define the system’s variance as
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
σiσ jLikL jkλk
In their work, Billio et al. (2012) argue that the more interconnected a system is, the less eigen-
values are necessary to explain a proportion of H of the system’s variance σ2S .10 A univariate
measure of an institution’s interconnectedness with the system of N financial institutions is then
given by
PCAS i,n :=
n∑
k=1
σ2i
σ2S
L2ikλk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
hn>H
where PCAS i,n is the contribution of institution i to the risk of the system, and hn is
∑n
k=1 λk∑N
k=1 λk
with
a prescribed threshold H.
The more interconnected an insurer is with the rest of the financial sector, the higher its sys-
temic relevance will be. We therefore expect our proxy for interconnectedness to enter our re-
10 Following a suggestion in Billio et al. (2012), we set H = 0.33.
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gressions of ΔCoVaR with a significant negative sign. Similarly, we expect interconnectedness to
have a positive effect on both MES and SRISK, since being more interconnected with the financial
system exposes insurers to contagion risks from other banks and insurers.
To proxy for the size of an insurer, we use the natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets.11
We expect insurer size to be an economically significant driver of systemic risk. On the one hand,
a larger company is less likely to suffer from cumulative losses due to its broader range of pooled
risks and better risk diversification. On the other hand, an insurer could become more systemically
relevant by being too-big-to-fail and too-complex-to-fail (see IAIS, 2012).
Another important explanatory variable in our regressions is an insurer’s leverage ratio. We
follow Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and approximate an insurer’s leverage
as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity. We have no prediction for the sign of the coefficient on leverage in our
regression. High leverage is a factor that incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to in-
crease a firm’s profitability.12 In contrast, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) argue that managers of
companies with high leverage could feel pressured by investors to provide enough liquid assets to
cover the payment of interests. Consequently, a higher leverage could exert a disciplining function
on managers leading to a decrease in an insurer’s total risk.
Furthermore, we employ several other insurer- and country-specific characteristics as con-
trol variables. We include the variable debt maturity which is defined as the ratio of total long
term debt to total debt. There exists a wide consensus among economists and regulators that
the dependence of certain banks and insurers on short-term funding exposed these institutions
to liquidity risks during the financial crisis and ultimately led to significant systemic risks (see
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Cummins and Weiss, 2012; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Conse-
quently, the IAIS has included the ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing and total
11 In our robustness checks, we use net revenues, given as the log value of an insurer’s total operating revenue, as
an alternative proxy for firm size.
12 Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Hovakimian et al. (2012)
who present empirical evidence that banks with low leverage during the crisis performed better and had a smaller
contribution to systemic risk.
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assets in its methodology as a key indicator of systemic relevance. We adopt their line of thought
but use total long-term debt instead of short term debt.
To include a proxy for an insurer’s investment success in our panel regression, we use the ratio
of investment income to net revenues. It is defined as the ratio of an insurer’s absolute investment
income to the sum of absolute investment income and absolute earned premiums. To characterize
the quality of the insurance portfolio, in our analysis we compute the insurer’s loss ratio, con-
structed by adding claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves and dividing by
premiums earned. We expect insurers with higher loss ratios to contribute more to systemic risk.
In our regressions, we also use an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of
common equity divided by the book value of common equity.
Next, we employ the insurers’ operating expense ratio, given by the ratio of operating expenses
to total assets, to control for the quality of management.13 Furthermore, we follow the reasoning
of the IAIS (2012) and control for the degree to which an insurer engages in non-traditional and
non-insurance activities. We use the variable Other income defined as other pre-tax income and
expenses besides operating income. If an insurer operates more outside the traditional insurance
business, e.g., by mimicking banks or becoming a central counterparty for credit derivatives, the
more will it be exposed to systemic risks from the financial sector as its interrelations with other
financial institutions increase. Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between other income
and systemic risk.
Another variable that captures the non-core activities of insurers is non-policyholder liabilities,
which is given by the total on balance-sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. We
suspect a positive correlation of non-policyholder liabilities and systemic risk as policyholder lia-
bilities are indicative of traditional insurance activities (see IAIS, 2012). To proxy for an insurer’s
profitability and past performance in our regressions, we use the standard measures Return on Eq-
uity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Higher profits can act as a buffer against future losses thus
shielding an insurer against adverse effects spilling over from the financial sector. Additionally,
13 In our robustness checks, we also compute the operating expense ratio by dividing operating expenses by earned
premiums.
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we employ the quarterly buy-and-hold returns on an insurer’s stock as an independent variable. It
is very likely that insurers that performed well in the past will continue to perform well over time.
However, institutions that took on too many risks in the past could also stick to their culture of
risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and increase their exposure and contribution to systemic
risk. We therefore expect this measure to have a positive impact on the systemic risk of insurers.
Finally, we also consider macroeconomic and country-specific characteristics variables like
the GDP growth rate (in %) and the log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. Moreover, we
employ a country’s stock market turnover, which is defined as the total value of shares traded in a
given country divided by the average market capitalization.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables we use in our
analysis.
[Place Table I about here]
For our full sample of life and non-life insurers, we only find limited evidence of a systemic
importance of insurers. Although weakly economically significant, insurers had mean estimates of
MES and ΔCoVaR of only 1% during our full sample period. The summary statistics on SRISK
also underline the finding that the majority of insurers did not significantly contribute to the in-
stability of the financial sector. However, the minimum estimate of ΔCoVaR and the maximum
SRISK estimate show that at least some insurers contributed significantly to systemic risk at some
point during our sample period. Intuitively, we would expect insurers to have experienced the ex-
treme values of systemic relevance during the financial crisis. This intuition is proven in Figure 1
in which we plot the time evolution of the three systemic risk measures we use over the course of
our complete sample period.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
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We can see from Figure 1 that the mean MES is relatively constant over time, showing a sig-
nificant peak during the financial crisis. The exposure to systemic risk during this peak, however,
is highly economically significant with insurers, on average, suffering losses of 5% on their stocks
on those days the market plummeted. Some insurers were hit even harder with MES estimates of
up to 10%. The second plot for our estimates of the insurers’ ΔCoVaR shows a similar picture.
The contribution to systemic risk by insurers was low to non-existent until 2007 when both mean
and minimum ΔCoVaR estimates decreased dramatically. After the crisis, the average ΔCoVaR
of insurers increased again showing that the average contribution of insurers to systemic risk was
again limited. This result is corroborated by the plot of the insurers’ SRISK estimates.
Further summary statistics for our explanatory variables given in Table I show that the average
interconnectedness of the insurers in our sample is limited. Some insurers, however, are strongly
interconnected with the rest of the global insurance sector. Most notably, AIG, AON, AXA, Gen-
worth, and MunichRe are above the 99% quantile of our interconnectedness variable. The average
size of a sample insurer is ca. $ 65 billion. Note that our sample includes both very small (5%
quantile: $ 1.2 billion) and very large insurers (95% quantile: $ 331.6 billion).
The insurers in our sample, on average, had relatively long-term funding structures and not
unusually high leverage ratios. However, the mean values for the insurers’ leverage and loss ratios
indicate the existence of few extreme outliers. We address this problem later on in our robustness
checks by winsorizing our explanatory variables at the 1% and 99% quantiles. Finally, across our
full panel, insurers had negligible quaterly buy-and-hold stock returns while the average return on
assets was 1.88%.
Although the summary statistics for our full sample yield some instructive information on our
sample, some of our variables differ significantly for life and non-life insurers. To get a better
understanding of the composition of our sample, we therefore split our sample into life and non-
life insurers and compare selected summary statistics across both lines of business. The resulting
summary statistics and tests of the equality of sample means are presented in Table II. Summary
statistics are given separately for our full sample period in Panel A and for the sub-sample of the
11
quarters during the financial crisis in Panel B.
[Place Table II about here]
In Panel A of Table II, we compare the values of the systemic risk measures together with the
three main (presumed) determinants of systemic risk (size, leverage, and interconnectedness) for
the life and non-life insurers in our sample. In addition, the differences in these variables for life
and non-life insurers are visualized in Figure 2.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
We can see from both Table II and Figure 2 that the means of the variables differ substantially
for life and non-life insurers. First, both the mean estimates of MES and ΔCoVaR are higher for
life insurers than for non-life insurers. In contrast, on average, non-life insurers have significantly
higher SRISK estimates than life insurers. These differences are statistically significant although
the absolute levels of the average contribution and exposure to systemic risk are again not econom-
ically significant (at least not across our full panel).14
Concerning the potential drivers of systemic risk in insurance, the univariate analysis given in
Table II shows that non-life insurers are, on average, slightly more interconnected but are signif-
icantly smaller and less levered than life insurers. Non-life insurers have mean total assets of $
43 billion while life insurers are significantly larger with mean total assets of $ 94.66 billion. The
leverage of the average non-life insurer is 16 whereas the average life insurer has a leverage 56.
Although the mean estimates are again distorted in part by the presence of few extreme outliers,
the quantiles presented in Table II underline the finding that life insurer are significantly larger and
more levered. Based on the univariate analysis, we could conclude that size and leverage appear to
be driving systemic risk while interconnectedness does not play such an important role for explain-
ing differences in MES, ΔCoVaR, and SRISK. However, all three explanatory variables are most
14 Furthermore, the differences in the mean SRISK and ΔCoVaR estimates are most likely due to the different sizes
of the samples for which both measures can be computed.
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likely correlated. Consequently, an investigation into the determinants of an insurer’s systemic
importance ultimately requires a multivariate analysis.
Corresponding summary statistics for the crisis period given in Panel B of Table II highlight
the increase in the systemic importance of insurers during the financial crisis. For example, the
exposure to systemic risk of non-life insurers rose on average by 2 percentage points to a MES
of 3.4% during the crisis (for life insurers, the MES was even 2.4 percentage points higher during
the crisis). Similarly, both life and non-life insurers had dramatically higher ΔCoVaR and SRISK
estimates during the financial crisis.
Before turning to our panel regression analysis of the systemic relevance of global insurers,
we shortly comment on the subset of nine Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) as
identified by the Financial Stability Board in July 2013. In Table III, we repeat our analysis of the
summary statistics of our systemic risk measures and selected explanatory variables for the nine
G-SIIs.
[Place Table III about here]
During our full sample period, the nine G-SIIs had average MES and ΔCoVaR estimates that
did not significantly differ from those of insurers that were not deemed to be systemically important
by the Financial Stability Board. However, global systemically important insurers had a signifi-
cantly higher mean SRISK than insurers in our full sample. Most importantly, however, average
estimates for the three systemic risk measures of G-SIIs increased significantly during the financial
crisis as shown in Figure 3.
[Place Figure 3 about here]
As expected, G-SIIs, on average also had significantly higher total assets and were more in-
terconnected. Interestingly, the mean leverage of the nine G-SIIs was lower than the leverage of
both the average life and non-life insurer in our full sample. Not surprisingly, all variables are on
average significantly higher during the crisis than in our full sample. Again, however, these uni-
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variate results for our full sample period do not take into account the (possibly strong) correlations
between size, interconnectedness, and leverage.
3 The determinants of systemic risk of insurers
In this section, we investigate the question which factors determine an insurer’s contribution
and exposure to systemic risk. First, we comment on the results of our baseline panel regressions.
Afterwards, we report and comment the results of various robustness checks.
3.1 Panel Regressions
Based on the findings from our univariate analysis, we now perform a multivariate panel regres-
sion analysis of our sample of international insurers. In particular, we intend to test the hypothesis
that systemic risk in insurance is predominantly driven by an insurer’s size, its leverage, and its
interconnectedness with the rest of the insurance sector. In our baseline setting, we perform several
panel regressions with the three systemic risk measures introduced in 2 as our dependent variables.
The set of independent variables includes both the set of key features of systemic relevance as pro-
posed by the IAIS (2012) and various control variables as outlined in Section 2.3 and Table A.2.
The econometric strategy we use is illustrated below.
S ystemicRiski,t+1 = β0 + β1 · Total assetsi,t + β2 · Leveragei,t + β3 · Interconnectednessi,t
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t + Θ · Country controlsi,t + εi,t
(1)
where S ystemicRiski,t+1 is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in
quarter t + 1 and Insurer controlsi,t as well as Country controlsi,t are various firm-specific and
country-specific control variables, respectively. To mitigate the possibility of reverse causality be-
tween our dependent and explanatory variables driving our results, we lag all explanatory variables
by one quarter. Furthermore, we perform separate regressions for life and non-life insurers to ac-
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count for systematic differences in accounting in different lines of insurance business. In addition,
we estimate all panel regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors and
with insurer- and time-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The results of our
baseline regressions are presented in Table IV.
[Place Table IV about here]
Starting with regressions (1) and (2) of the insurers’ ΔCoVaR, we can see that neither the
insurers’ interconnectedness nor their size is a significant driver of the contribution to systemic
risk. This first finding is in striking contrast to the hypotheses formulated by the IAIS on the
pivotal role of size and interconnectedness for an insurer’s systemic importance. For the leverage
of a firm, we find different results for the life and non-life insurance sector. Our results suggest
that the more levered a life insurer is, the less it contributes to the system’s fragility. This result
is statistically significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, we notice a different effect for
non-life insurance companies: the variable leverage enters the regression with a negative sign and
is highly significant. Our result implies that the use of high leverage in the non-life insurance
business therefore decreases the value of ΔCoVaR and consequently increases a non-life insurer’s
contribution to systemic risk. The opposite result can be found for the relation between ΔCoVaR
and the insurers’ loss ratios. While higher loss ratios increase the systemic risk contribution of non-
life insurers, the opposite is true for life insurers. Two more things are noteworthy in regressions
(1) and (2). First, a life insurer’s stock performance seems to have a negative effect on systemic
risk. In comparison, a non-life insurer’s contribution to systemic risk is not dependent on its prior
stock performance as a proxy for the insurer’s culture of risk-taking. Second, an increased use
of non-policyholder liabilities in the non-life insurance sector seems to significantly add to the
insurance sector’s fragility.
Next, we report the results of our regressions (3) and (4) of the insurers’ Marginal Expected
Shortfall as the dependent variable. Interestingly, we find a positive relation between the intercon-
nectedness of a non-life insurer and its exposure to systemic risk spilling over from the insurance
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sector. We thus conclude that being highly interconnected does not necessarily lead to a signifi-
cantly higher contribution to systemic fragility, but rather to a higher exposure to adverse spillover
effects. Furthermore, leverage enters both regressions for life and non-life insurers with a statis-
tically significant and positive sign. In line with our expectation, higher leverage thus appears to
significantly increase an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk. Higher operating to total assets ratios
are associated with a higher MES of insurers. So is a worse stock performance in the past.
Finally, in model specifications (5) and (6), we employ the insurers’ SRISK as the dependent
variable. Underlining our previous findings from the regressions of ΔCoVaR, we find no evidence
for the hypothesis that the contribution of insurers to systemic risk is significantly affected by
the interconnectedness of an individual insurer within the sector. For non-life insurers, we again
find leverage to have a mitigating effect on systemic risk. However, in contrast to our previous
regressions, insurer size is statistically significantly related to the SRISK of non-life insurers. For
the life insurers in our sample, we find no significance for any of these factors. Nevertheless, we
find statistically significant correlations between the life insurers’ SRISK and their market-to-book
ratios as well as their non-policyholder liabilities. These findings for SRISK have to be taken
with careful consideration, however, since the adjusted R-squared in the regressions of SRISK is
considerably lower than in the regressions of MES and ΔCoVaR.
3.2 Additional analyses
The results of our baseline regressions have produced only weak evidence that size, intercon-
nectedness, and leverage are fundamental drivers of systemic risk in insurance. To get a deeper
understanding of the relation between idiosyncratic insurer characteristics and systemic risk, we
perform several additional analyses in this subsection.
First, we examine the question whether the exposure and contribution of large insurers to sys-
temic risk are driven by different factors than the systemic risk measures of insurers in our full
sample. To this end, we restrict our sample to insurer-quarter observations of institutions in the top
75% quantile of total assets. The motivation behind our analysis is that the relation between some
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of our explanatory variables and the systemic risk of an insurer might be mitigated or exacerbated
by the insurer’s size. The results for the regression using insurers in the top total assets quartile
only are presented in Table V.
[Place Table V about here]
Several of the results from our baseline regressions carry over to our analysis of large insur-
ers. However, regressions (3) and (4) in Table V reveal one striking difference. In contrast to our
baseline regressions, the interconnectedness of an insurer is now significantly positively related to
its exposure to systemic risk. This result holds for both large life and non-life insurers. Similarly
to the analysis of our full sample, insurer size is only significant in the regression of the SRISK
of non-life insurers. For large insurers, the relation between MES, ΔCoVaR and leverage is as ex-
pected. Higher leverage increases both the contribution and the exposure of large life and non-life
insurers to systemic risk. While leverage is positively related to the purely equity-based measures
of systemic risk, we find a significant negative correlation between leverage and SRISK as our
third measure of systemic risk. Furthermore, and in line with our expectation, we find higher loss
ratios to be positively associated with the contribution of large insurers to systemic risk. Finally,
just like in our baseline regressions, the stock performance of the insurers in the previous quarter
is negatively related to the (life and non-life) insurers’ MES.
Next, we address the question whether the drivers of systemic risk in insurance differ across
countries. In fact, it is very possible that insurance companies and even whole sectors function
in a different way than their counterparts in foreign countries. Even more importantly, insurance
regulation differs substantially from country to country. Although we control for these systematic
differences by the use of country-fixed effects in our robustness checks, it is nevertheless instruc-
tive to analyze these country differences in the relation between systemic risk and the insurers’
idiosyncratic characteristics in more detail. Our sample is composed of 95 insurers with headquar-
ters located in the United States and 158 insurers from other countries. To analyze the differential
drivers of systemic risk, we estimate separate panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
The results are given in Table VI.
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[Place Table VI about here]
The first difference to our baseline regressions is the significance of the coefficient on our proxy
for interconnectedness in the regressions of ΔCoVaR. For U.S. based life insurers, interconnect-
edness enters the regression of ΔCoVaR with a negative sign that is significant at the 10% level.
Moreover, we find a fundamental difference between the drivers of the systemic risk exposure of
U.S. and non-U.S. insurers. While the MES of U.S. insurers is not significantly affected by the
insurers’ interconnectedness, the opposite is true for non-U.S. insurers for which the institutions’
interconnectedness significantly drives their exposure to market stress. With the exception of the
regressions the SRISK estimates of non-life insurers outside the U.S., total assets is not a statisti-
cally significant determinant of systemic risk. In contrast, leverage is significantly related to the
exposure to systemic risk of non-life insurers (U.S. and non-U.S.) and life insurers (only U.S.).
For the regressions of ΔCoVaR, we again only find mixed evidence for a destabilizing effect of
leverage. Among the remaining control variables, it is interesting to note that non-policyholder
liabilities are negatively related to systemic risk in several of our regressions. However, in most of
these regressions, no clear trend across business lines and geographical regions is observable.
Finally, we investigate the question whether our results change significantly if we restrict our
sample to the time period of the financial crisis. In particular, we hypothesize that size, intercon-
nectedness, and leverage might only have been key drivers of systemic risk in insurance during the
financial crisis. To this end, in Table VII, we repeat our previous baseline regressions but restrict
our sample to a smaller time period covering the period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010 (i.e., the time
around and during the financial crisis).
[Place Table VII about here]
This time, we find a statistically significant and negative impact of interconnectedness on the
ΔCoVaR of life insurers. Furthermore, more interconnected insurers also have higher MES and
SRISK estimates. Again, insurer size does not appear to be systematically related to systemic
risk of insurers. However, and in contrast to our baseline regressions, leverage now consistently
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appears to be a significant driver of an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. In our crisis sub-
sample, a higher leverage leads to a higher systemic risk exposure and contribution for non-life
insurers and to a slightly higher contribution of life insurers to systemic risk. Interestingly, the past
stock performance is not as important as it has been in our prior regressions, possibly due to the
pervasively bad stock performance of insurers during the crisis.15 Furthermore, in regressions (1)
and (3), we find that a higher fraction of non-policyholder liabilities during the crisis period leads
to an increase in systemic risk contribution and exposure for life insurers.
3.3 Robustness checks
We also estimate regressions in which we employ alternative measures of an insurer’s size
(net revenues instead of total assets), profitability (ROE instead of ROA) and investment activity
(ratio of the insurers investment income to net revenues instead of the ratio of the insurers absolute
investment income to the sum of absolute investment income and absolute earned premiums),
respectively. Additional regressions using the beta of an insurer’s stock yield no change in our
results. As mentioned before, we also replace total assets with premiums earned in the calculation
of our variable operating expenses. However, our previous conclusions remain valid.
Next, it could be argued that our results are driven by the specific manner in which we estimate
the Marginal Expected Shortfall and the other systemic risk measures. To control for this potential
bias, we recalculate MES and ΔCoVaR using three alternative indexes. To be precise, we employ
the World DS Full Lin Insurer Index, the MSCI World Banks Index and the MSCI World Insurance
Index taken from Datastream. The results show that our conclusions remain unchanged.
Finally, we winsorize all data at the 1% and 99% quantiles to minimize a possible bias due to
outliers and reestimate all our regressions using winsorized data. The results of these alternative
regressions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
15 This issue has been discussed in Weiß et al. (2013) who show that crisis sentiment caused insurers to have an
even worse stock performance, on average, than banks during the crisis.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life
insurers to global systemic risk in the period from 2000 to 2012. As our main result, we find sys-
temic risk in the international insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the
literature for banks in our full sample. During the financial crisis, however, insurers did contribute
significantly to the instability of the financial sector. Further, we conclude that systemic risk of
insurers is determined by various factors including an insurer’s interconnectedness and leverage,
the magnitudes and significances of these effects, however, differ depending on the systemic risk
measure used and with the analyzed insurer line and geographic region. Most interestingly, we
find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant driver of
the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk
appears to be driven by (among others) leverage, loss ratios, and the insurer’s funding fragility.
Our results also show that life insurers do not contribute significantly more to global systemic
risk than non-life insurers. In addition, there seems to be little difference in the interconnected-
ness of life and non-life insurers. In our study, we find no convincing evidence in support of the
hypothesis that insurer size is a fundamental driver of the contribution of an insurer to systemic
risk. In contrast to the banking sector, we show that the insurance sector predominantly suffers
from being exposed to systemic risk, rather than adding to the financial system’s fragility. Finally,
our study reveals that both the systemic risk exposure and the contribution of international insurers
were limited prior to the financial crisis with all measures of systemic risk increasing significantly
during the crisis.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Sample Insurance Companies.
The appendix lists all international insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample is con-
structed by first selecting all international insurers from the country and dead-firm lists of Thomson Reuters Financial
Datastream. The list is then corrected for all companies for which stock price and balance sheet data are not available
from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Worldscope. The names of the companies are retrieved from the
Worldscope database (item WC06001).
ALEA GROUP HOLDINGS AXA ASIA PACIFIC ERGO PREVIDENZA
CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC AXA LEBENSVERSICH ERGO-VERSICHERUNG
21ST CENTURY INS AXA KONZERN AG ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS
ACE LIMITED AXA PORTUGAL SEGUROS ERIE INDEMNITY
AEGON N.V. AXA VERSICHERUNG AG ETHNIKI GREEK INS
AFFIN-ACF HOLDINGS AXIS CAPITAL HLDG EULER HERMES
AFLAC INCORPORATED BALOISE HOLDING AG EVEREST RE GROUP
AFRICAN LIFE BENFIELD GROUP LTD FAIRFAX FIN’L HLDGS
AGEAS SA BRIT INSURANCE HOLD FBD HOLDINGS PLC
ASSURANCES GENERALES CAPITAL ALLIANCE FBL FINANCIAL GROUP
AIOI INSURANCE CASH.LIFE AG FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES
ALFA CORPORATION CATHAY FINANCIAL FINAXA SA
ALLEANZA ASSICUR. CATLIN GROUP LTD FIRST FIRE & MARINE
ALLEGHANY CORP CATTOLICA ASS FONDIARIA - SAI SPA
ALLIANZ SE CESKA POJISTOVNA A.S FOYER S.A.
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERS. CHALLENGER FIN’L SVC FPIC INSURANCE GROUP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION CHESNARA PLC FRIENDS PROVIDENT
ALM BRAND AS CHINA LIFE INSURANCE FUBON FINANCIAL
ALTERRA CAPITAL CHINA TAIPING INSU FUJI FIRE& MARINE INS
AMBAC FINANCIAL CHUBB CORP (THE) GENERALI (SCHWEIZ)
AMERICAN NATIONAL CINCINNATI FINL CORP GENERALI DEUTSCH
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CLAL INSURANCE ENT GENERALI HOLDING VIE
AMERICAN EQUITY INV CNA FINANCIAL CORP GENWORTH FIN’L, INC.
AMERICAN FIN’L GROUP CNA SURETY CORP GLOBAL INDEMNITY
AMERICAN INT’L GROUP CNO FINANCIAL GRUPO NACIONAL
AMERUS GROUP CO CNP ASSURANCES GRUPO PROFUTURO
AMLIN PLC CODAN A/S GREAT EASTERN HLDGS
AMP LIMITED GROUPE COFACE GREAT WEST LIFECO
ANN & LIFE RE HLDGS COMMERCE GROUP, INC. GRUPO CATALANA
AON PLC MILANO ASSICURAZIONI GREAT AMERICAN FIN’L
ARAB INSURANCE GROUP COX INSURANCE HANNOVER RUECK SE
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP DAI-ICHI LIFE INSU HANOVER INSURANCE
ARGONAUT GROUP, INC. DAIDO LIFE INSURANCE HAREL INSUR INVEST
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER DBV WINTERTHUR HARLEYSVILLE GROUP
ASIA FINANCIAL HLDGS DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP HARTFORD FINL SRVC
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLD DELTA LLOYD LEBENS HCC INS HOLDINGS
ASSICUR GENERALI SPA DONGBU INSURANCE CO. HELVETIA HOLDING
ASSURANT INC DEUTSCHE AERZTEVERS HILB, ROGAL & HOBBS
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD E-L FINANCIAL CORP. HILLTOP HOL
AVIVA PLC EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS HISCOX PLC
AXA SA ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HORACE MANN EDUCATRS
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Table A.1: Sample Insurance Companies (continued).
HYUNDAI M & F INS. OLD REPUBLIC INTL SWISS RE
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE PARTNERRE LTD. TAIWAN LIFE INSURANC
INFINITY PROP & CAS PENN TREATY AMERICAN TAIYO LIFE INSURANCE
ING GROEP N.V. PERMANENT TSB GROUP TOKIO MARINE
INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PHILADELPHIA CORP TONG YANG LIFE INS
INTACT FINANCIAL PHOENIX COMPANIES TOPDANMARK A/S
IPC HOLDINGS, LTD. PHOENIX HOLDINGS TORCHMARK CORP
JARDINE LLOYD PICC PROPERTY TORO ASSICURAZIONI
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP PING AN INSURANCE TOWER LTD
JOHN HANCOCK FIN SVC PLAT UNDERWRITERS TRANSATLANTIC HLDGS
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS PMA CAPITAL CORP TRAVELERS COS
KEMPER POHJOLA-YHTYMA OYJ TRAVELERS PROPERTY
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL POWER CORP OF CANADA TRYG A/S
KOELNISCHE RUECKVER. POWER FINANCIAL CORP UICI
KOREAN REINSURANCE PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA UNIPOL GRUPPO FIN
LANDAMERICA FINL GRP PRESIDENTIAL LIFE UNIQA INSUR
LEGAL & GEN’L GRP PRINCIPAL FINL GROUP UNITED FIRE
LIBERTY GROUP LTD PROASSURANCE CORP PROVIDENT COMPANIES
LIBERTY HOLDINGS PROGRESSIVE CORP WAADT VERSICHERUNGEN
LIG INSURANCE CO LTD PROMINA GROUP VESTA INSURANCE GRP
LINCOLN NAT’L CORP PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP VIENNA INSURANCE
LOEWS CORPORATION PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE VITTORIA ASSICURAZIO
MAA GROUP PRUDENTIAL PLC W R BERKLEY CORP.
MANULIFE FINANCIAL PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL WELLINGTON
MAPFRE SA QBE INSURANCE GROUP WESCO FINANCIAL CORP
MARKEL CORP RIUNIONE ADRIATICA WHITE MOUNTAIN INSUR
MARSH & MCLENNAN CO. REINSURANCE GROUP WILLIS GROUP
MBIA INC RENAISSANCERE HLDGS WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LE
MEDIOLANUM RHEINLAND HOLDING XL GROUP PLC
MENORAH MIVTACHIM RLI CORP ZENITH NATIONAL
MERCURY GENERAL CORP RSA INSURANCE GROUP ZURICH INSURANCE
METLIFE INC SAFECO CORPORATION
MIDLAND COMPANY SAFETY INSURANCE GP
MIGDAL INSURAN & FIN SAMPO OYJ
MIIX GROUP, INC SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE
MNI HOLDINGS BHD SOUTH AFRICAN NAT’L
MONTPELIER RE HLDGS SCHWEIZERISCHE NAT
MONY GROUP INC. SCOR SE
MS& AD INSURANCE SCOTTISH RE GROUP
MUENCHENER SELECTIVE INSURANCE
NATIONAL WESTERN SHIN KONG FINANCIAL
NATIONWIDE FIN’L SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC SOMPO JAPAN INSURANC
NIPPONKOA INS SAINT JAMES’S PLACE
NISSAY DOWA GEN STANCORP FINANCIAL
NISSHIN FIRE/MAR INS STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
NUERNBERGER BET.-AG STOREBRAND ASA
ODYSSEY RE SUL AMERICA SEGUROS
OHIO CASUALTY CORP SUN LIFE FINANCIAL
OLD MUTUAL PLC SWISS LIFE HOLDING
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Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
ΔCoVaR Unconditional ΔCoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), measured as the
difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sector index conditional on the distress
of a particular insurer and the VaR of the sector index conditional on the median state of
the insurer.
Datastream, own calc.
MES Quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined byAcharya et al. (2010) as the average
return on an individual insurer’s stock on the days the World Datastream Bank index
experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
SRISK Average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al.
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The SRISK estimate for insurer i at time t is
given by S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
)− (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t where k is a regulatory
capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of debt, LRMESi,t is the long
run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · MES ), MES is the estimated
Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the insurer’s market value of equity.
Datastream, Worldscope
(WC03351, WC08001),
own. calc.
Insurer characteristics
Beta Beta of the capital asset pricing model measuring the market sensitivity of a firm and a
local market index of the insurer’s country.
Worldscope (WC09802).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255).
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012). PCAS is constructed using a decompo-
sition of the variance-covariance matrix of the insurers’ daily, standardized stock returns.
Datastream, own calc.
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity.
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves to earned premiums. Worldscope (WC15549).
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Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Insurer characteristics
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Worldscope (WC07210,
WC03501).
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope (WC01001).
Non-Policyholder Liabili-
ties
Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030).
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income. Worldscope (WC01262).
Performance Quarterly buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock. Datastream, own calc.
Return on Assets Return of the insurer on it’s total assets after taxes (in %). Worldscope (WC08326).
Return on Equity An insurer’s earnings per share during the last 12 months over the prorated book value
per share times 100 (in %).
Worldscope (WC08372).
Total assets Natural logarithm of a insurer’s total assets. Worldscope (WC02999).
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database (World
Bank).
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database (World
Bank)
Stock market turnover Total value of shares traded in a given country divided by the average market capitaliza-
tion.
WDI database (World
Bank).
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the systemic risk measures in the period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES), SRISK, and
ΔCoVaR over our full sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 international life and non-
life insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure (black line) is plotted against the corresponding
10% and 90% percent quantiles (grey lines). All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2: Comparison of systemic risk measures, interconnectedness, insurer size and leverage
between life and non-life insurers.
The figures show boxplots of the three systemic risk measures MES, ΔCoVaR, and SRISK, interconnectedness, total
assets, and leverage of life and non-life insurers. The sample consists of 112 life and 141 non-life insurers and covers
the time period from 2000 to 2012. All data are winsorized at the 1% level. Variables and data sources are defined in
Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of systemic risk measures for (systemically relevant) insurers in the
period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES), SRISK, and
ΔCoVaR over a sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 international life and non-life in-
surers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure in each quarter is given for a sample of 253 international
insurers (yellow shaded area) and for the nine insurers identified as global systemically important by the IAIS (2012)
(black bars). All data are winsorized at the 1% level. Variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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Table IV: Baseline panel regressions.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of
international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are
estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with robust standard errors. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t+1 = β0 + β1 · Total assetsi,t + β2 · Leveragei,t + β3 · Interconnectednessi,t
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t + Θ ·Country controlsi,t + εi,t
where S ystemicRiski,t+1 is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t + 1 and
Insurer controlsi,t as well as Country controlsi,t are various firm-specific and country-specific control variables. The
sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers and 141 international non-life insurers
over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. P-values are reported in parentheses and all explanatory variables are
lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R 2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ΔCoVaR ΔCoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.020** -152.400 1,893.468
(0.167) (0.667) (0.319) (0.028) (0.741) (0.170)
Total assets 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.675 4.890**
(0.319) (0.814) (0.302) (0.577) (0.148) (0.016)
Leverage 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.008 -0.137***
(0.050) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.303) (0.000)
Debt maturity 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.130 -2.863
(0.356) (0.275) (0.310) (0.424) (0.653) (0.113)
Investment success -0.003 -0.004 -0.003* -0.001 -0.174 -0.666
(0.760) (0.288) (0.062) (0.766) (0.675) (0.580)
Loss ratio -0.000 0.000** -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.163) (0.013) (0.080) (0.884) (0.874) (0.167)
Market-to-book ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.163** 0.155
(0.720) (0.174) (0.908) (0.002) (0.028) (0.414)
Non-policyholder liabilities 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 -0.003** 0.027
(0.017) (0.001) (0.512) (0.486) (0.013) (0.354)
Operating expenses 0.015* -0.001 0.015* 0.014** -1433 11461
(0.010) (0.723) (0.067) (0.027) (0.412) (0.124)
Other income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.074) (0.247) (0.517) (0.387) (0.685) (0.539)
ROA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.044 0.114
(0.799) (0.561) (0.449) (0.365) (0.337) (0.222)
Performance -0.006*** 0.001 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.154 -0.670*
(0.172) (0.738) (0.009) (0.003) (0.493) (0.100)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.049 -0.086
(0.133) (0.203) (0.994) (0.490) (0.417) (0.429)
Inflation -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.001*** -0.009 -0.167*
(0.658) (0.863) (0.081) (0.003) (0.873) (0.076)
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002 0.025***
(0.488) (0.130) (0.001) (0.003) (0.419) (0.001)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,088 1,546 3,088 4,068 2,958 3,936
R2 0.441 0.542 0.441 0.44 0.203 0.130
Adj. R2 0.429 0.521 0.429 0.431 0.185 0.115
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Table V: Panel regressions - Large insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of
international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are
estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with robust standard errors. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t+1 = β0 + β1 · Total assetsi,t + β2 · Leveragei,t + β3 · Interconnectednessi,t
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t + Θ ·Country controlsi,t + εi,t
where S ystemicRiski,t+1 is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t + 1 and
Insurer controlsi,t as well as Country controlsi,t are various firm-specific and country-specific control variables. The
sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers and 141 international non-life insurers
over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. In contrast to our baseline setting, in these regressions, we only use
insurer-quarters of insurers in the top total assets quartile. P-values are reported in parantheses and all explanatory
variables are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R 2 is adjusted
R-squared.
Dependent variable: ΔCoVaR ΔCoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness -5.983 -1.621 0.031*** 0.026** -1,643.375 10,791.031
(0.140) (0.566) (0.001) (0.013) (0.781) (0.181)
Total assets -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 3.573 9.626***
(0.543) (0.377) (0.637) (0.391) (0.131) (0.001)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.097* -0.106***
(0.985) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.077) (0.003)
Debt maturity -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.938 -18.636*
(0.781) (0.404) (0.617) (0.964) (0.281) (0.079)
Investment success -0.009 -0.022** -0.003 0.030 -0.179 -13516
(0.189) (0.014) (0.313) (0.273) (0.888) (0.134)
Loss ratio -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.017
(0.025) (0.060) (0.117) (0.694) (0.831) (0.318)
Market-to-book ratio 0.001 -0.002* 0.001** 0.001 -0.430 9.102**
(0.110) (0.065) (0.032) (0.549) (0.297) (0.041)
Non-policyholder -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.164
(0.358) (0.534) (0.150) (0.822) (0.133) (0.692)
Operating expenses 0.002 -0.054*** 0.033** -0.007 10323 32967
(0.921) (0.004) (0.019) (0.839) (0.168) (0.276)
Other income 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.570) (0.500) (0.851) (0.744) (0.163) (0.250)
ROA -0.001*** 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.036 0.651*
(0.001) (0.056) (0.869) (0.974) (0.716) (0.057)
Performance -0.001 0.004** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.956 -1,009
(0.651) (0.037) (0.024) (0.005) (0.357) (0.649)
GDP -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.190 -0.881
(0.779) (0.535) (0.486) (0.970) (0.150) (0.246)
Inflation -0.000 -0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.537** 1316
(0.897) (0.015) (0.062) (0.369) (0.029) (0.182)
Turnover -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.081***
(0.038) (0.013) (0.270) (0.110) (0.301) (0.005)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 449 313 993 612 983 609
R2 0.623 0.847 0.586 0.498 0.222 0.380
Adj. R2 0.559 0.807 0.557 0.439 0.167 0.30635
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Table VII: Panel regressions for the crisis period
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly systemic risk of international insurers on key indicators
of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed
effects and with robust standard errors. The conceptual approach is the following:
S ystemicRiski,t+1 = β0 + β1 · Total assetsi,t + β2 · Leveragei,t + β3 · Interconnectednessi,t
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t + Θ ·Country controlsi,t + εi,t
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time period Q1 2006 to Q4
2010. P-values are reported in parantheses and all explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions
and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ΔCoVaR ΔCoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life) (Life) (Non-Life)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness -24.047** -10.783 28.087** 61.381*** 789.144 8,776.994**
(0.010) (0.112) (0.038) (0.000) (0.646) (0.028)
Total assets 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.011* 0.006 3.627*
(0.824) (0.976) (0.444) (0.055) (0.994) (0.064)
Leverage -0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001 -0.069***
(0.099) (0.000) (0.191) (0.000) (0.661) (0.002)
Debt maturity 0.004*** -0.007 0.001 0.006** -0.686 -5.499*
(0.008) (0.327) (0.722) (0.016) (0.148) (0.067)
Investment success 0.005 0.045* -0.002 0.004 0.067 0.633
(0.239) (0.096) (0.348) (0.149) (0.696) (0.497)
Loss ratio 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.752) (0.076) (0.117) (0.295) (0.445) (0.423)
Market-to-book ratio -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.004
(0.488) (0.639) (0.950) (0.499) (0.520) (0.925)
Non-policyholder liabilities -0.004*** 0.003 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.015
(0.009) (0.108) (0.049) (0.252) (0.777) (0.141)
Operating expenses -0.084* -0.003 0.035** 0.020 2.949 11.152
(0.090) (0.885) (0.047) (0.405) (0.390) (0.225)
Other income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.671) (0.441) (0.245) (0.981) (0.228) (0.037)
ROA -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.052 0.163
(0.823) (0.153) (0.680) (0.678) (0.360) (0.124)
Performance 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.007** -0.554 2.016**
(0.486) (0.888) (0.336) (0.044) (0.450) (0.035)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.178
(0.801) (0.793) (0.125) (0.030) (0.998) (0.691)
Inflation 0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.002** -0.084 -0.479**
(0.042) (0.477) (0.278) (0.012) (0.402) (0.041)
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005 0.025**
(0.724) (0.350) (0.003) (0.000) (0.110) (0.011)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 302 383 955 1,260 900 1,214
R2 0.535 0.569 0.408 0.519 0.184 0.111
Adj. R2 0.487 0.535 0.391 0.508 0.158 0.090
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